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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I. WHETHER CITIZENS TO SAVE THE BIRDS HAS
STANDING TO SUE, AND WHETHER THIS MAT-
TER IS RIPE FOR DECISION, CONSIDERING
BLACKACRE FOREST PRODUCTS HAS NOT YET
CAUSED THE DEATH OF ANY MIGRATORY BIRD
IN THE BIG TREE TRACT.
II. WHETHER THE MIGRATORY BIRD TREATY ACT IS
"LAW' WITH WHICH AGENCY ACTIONS UNDER
THE NATIONAL FOREST MANAGEMENT ACT
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MUST BE IN ACCORD FOR PURPOSES OF JUDI-
CIAL REVIEW UNDER THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURES ACT.
III. WHETHER SECTION 703(a) OF THE MIGRATORY
BIRD TREATY ACT SHOULD TO BE TREATED AS A
STRICT LIABILITY CRIMINAL PROVISION.
IV. WHETHER THE MIGRATORY BIRD TREATY ACT
PROHIBITS CAUSING THE DEATH OF MIGRA-
TORY BIRDS BY HARVESTING TIMBER DURING
THE NESTING SEASON.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Preliminary Statement
This is an appeal from an order entered by Judge R. N.
Remus in the United States District Court for the District of
New Union denying Appellants' motion to dismiss the action
brought against them by Citizens to Save the Birds, Inc.
(CSB) for judicial review of the grant of logging rights by the
United States Forest Service to Blackacre Forest Products,
1998] 875
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Inc. (Blackacre). (R. at 1.) The District Court held that
CSB's pleadings were legally sufficient to give rise to stand-
ing as a matter of law. (R. at 4.) Furthermore, the District
Court held that the matters of statutory interpretation
presented in this case offered a genuine issue of material fact
sufficient, as a matter of law, to cause Appellants' Motion to
Dismiss to be denied. (R. at 1.) Appellants challenge the
findings of the District Court on both the standing issue and
the various statutory interpretations made by the court. (R.
at 3-6.)
B. Standard of Review
"For purposes of standard of review, decisions by judges
are traditionally divided into three categories, denominated
questions of law (reviewable de novo), questions of fact (re-
viewable for clear error), and matters of discretion (review-
able for "abuse of discretion")." Pierce v. Underwood, 487
U.S. 552, 558 (1988). The District Court's decision below was
based upon statutory interpretation and consideration of case
law. Its holding was based upon questions of law and the
standard of appellate review, therefore, is de novo.
C. Statement of Facts
In May of 1997, the United States Forest Service (the
Forest Service) authorized a timber sale to Blackacre pursu-
ant to the National Forest Management Act (NFMA), 16
U.S.C. §§ 1600-1687, permitting Blackacre to harvest timber
on 500 acres known as the "Big Tree Tract" in the New Union
National Forest. (R. at 1.) The Big Tree Tract is part of an
area of old growth forest in the State of New Union which has
the potential to serve as a valuable timber resource for the
people of New Union. (R. at 1.) This sale was made in accord
with the Forest Service's natural resource management plan
(the Plan) developed under NFMA § 1604 and 36 C.F.R. pt.
219. (R. at 1.) The Plan designated some parts of the old
growth forest, including Big Tree Tract, for timber harvesting
and other parts for preservation. (R. at 1.) In conjunction
with the Forest Service's development of the Plan and the ac-
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tual timber sale itself, the Forest Service followed its normal
administrative procedures including the preparation of an
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) as required under
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 4321-4370. (R. at 1-2.)
Citizens to Save the Birds, Inc. (CSB) is a not-for-profit
corporation organized under the laws of the State of New
Union. (R. at 2.) CSB alleges its members' ability to observe
birds in the New Union National Forest in general, and the
Big Tree Tract in particular, would be adversely affected if
Blackacre were allowed to conduct timber harvesting activi-
ties in the Big Tree Tract. (R. at 2.) Specifically, CSB alleges
Blackacre's timber harvesting activities could cause the
deaths of migratory birds in violation of the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act (MBTA). (R. at 2-3.) CSB seeks judicial review of
the Forest Service's actions in making the sale under the
NFMA, using the standard for judicial review set forth in the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 706. (R. at
2.)
Blackacre and the United States have shown bird deaths
may occur as a result of logging only if Blackacre actually
harvests timber in the Big Tree Tract during nesting season.
(R. at 3.) Neither the United States nor Blackacre have
caused the death of any migratory bird by harvesting timber
or in any other manner. (R. at 3.) Timber harvesting activi-
ties have not taken place in the Big Tree Tract, nor is there
any evidence of Blackacre's intentions to ever log the Tract.
(R. at 3.) Furthermore, there is no proof of Blackacre's intent
to ever harvests timber in the Tract during the nesting sea-
son. (R. at 3.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The decision of the United States District Court for the
District of New Union denying Blackacre's Motion to Dismiss
should be reversed because the District Court's decision
rested on the following legal errors.
First, the District Court erroneously concluded CSB suf-
fered a "concrete and particularized" injury and therefore had
1998]
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standing to sue. The Supreme Court has held CSB must
have a "concrete and particularized" injury before a matter is
ripe for adjudication and before standing may be conferred
upon a plaintiff. Since no migratory bird has been killed in
the Big Tree Tract, CSB's injury is merely hypothetical.
Therefore, the matter is not ripe for adjudication, nor does
CSB have standing to sue.
Second, the District Court erred in allowing judicial re-
view under the APA. The APA authorizes judicial review
only when no alternative remedies are available. In CSB's
case, judicial review of the Forest Service's actions is avail-
able under the NFMA's regulatory framework. Therefore,
the District Court's grant of APA review was improper.
Third, the District Court erred in applying the MBTA as
a strict liability criminal statute. Congressional intent indi-
cates the MBTA was not intended to be applied as a strict
liability criminal statute. Furthermore, the application of the
MBTA as a strict liability criminal statute violates the Due
Process Clause by denying liberty to innocent violators of the
MBTA without due process of law.
Finally, the District Court erroneously concluded the
MBTA applies to ordinary land uses such as timber harvest-
ing. The plain language and the legislative history of the
MBTA indicate the statute applies solely to hunters and
poachers.
For the above mentioned reasons, Blackacre respectfully
requests this Court's reversal of the District Court's decision
below.
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ARGUMENT
I. CITIZENS TO SAVE THE BIRDS DOES NOT
HAVE STANDING TO SUE, NOR IS THIS
MATTER RIPE FOR ADJUDICATION, SINCE
BLACKACRE FOREST PRODUCTS HAS
NOT YET CAUSED THE DEATH OF ANY
MIGRATORY BIRD IN THE BIG TREE TRACT.
A. Absent a "Concrete and Particularized Injury," CSB
Does Not Have Standing to Sue.
The notion of standing is designed to determine "whether
[prospective plaintiffs] are the proper parties to bring.., suit,
thus focusing on the qualitative sufficiency of the injury and
whether the complainant has personally suffered the harm."
Wilderness Soc'y v. Alcock, 83 F.3d 386, 390 (11th Cir. 1996).
"In order to satisfy the 'case or controversy' requirement of
Article III [of the United States Constitution], which is the
irreducible constitutional minimum of standing, a plaintiff
must [among other things] demonstrate that he has suffered
'injury in fact'" Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
560-61 (1992); U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. The Defenders
Court has further defined an "injury in fact" to be an injury
which is: "(a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical." Id. at 560. "The
party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of estab-
lishing these elements." See FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493
U.S. 215, 231 (1990).
CSB has failed to show a "concrete and particularized in-
jury." The record indicates CSB's members allege they
"would be adversely affected if Blackacre were allowed" to
harvest timber in the Big Tree Tract. (R. at 2.) (emphasis
added). The United States Supreme Court has held a "would
be" injury is not a sufficient basis for granting standing, for it
"takes us into the area of speculation and conjecture."
O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 497 (1974). That is, "a
threatened injury must be 'certainly impending' to constitute
an injury in fact." Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158
(1990).
1998] 879
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There is no evidence of a "certainly impending" injury in
this case. In fact, quite the contrary is true. As Judge Remus
noted in her decision, "there is no proof that Blackacre is
about to log the Tract." (R. at 3.) Thus, the alleged injury
claimed by CSB cannot be deemed "certainly impending," be-
cause intervening events could easily cause CSB to suffer no
injury whatsoever and, thus, have no "case or controversy" to
bring before this Court. Blackacre may decide to sell its hold-
ings to a third party, relocate its operation, or go out of busi-
ness, never setting foot in the Big Tree Tract or removing a
single twig from its forest. With the potential for intervening
events looming, this Court should not be lured into a situa-
tion in which its conferral of standing upon CSB would vio-
late Article III of the Constitution by hearing a matter which
does not qualify as a bona-fide "case or controversy." As the
Supreme Court noted in Defenders, the injury must "proceed
with a high degree of immediacy in order to avoid deciding a
case in which no injury will occur." Defenders, 504 U.S. at
563 n.2.
Blackacre concedes it would be an entirely different situ-
ation if logging equipment were being transported to the
Tract, or if the chain saws were whirring and the sawdust
flying, for this action would clearly constitute an "impending
injury" consistent with the Court's holding in Defenders.
However, absent such a showing of "impending injury" on the
part of CSB, who is charged with the burden of producing
such a showing, this Court must find CSB has not presented
a "case or controversy" within the meaning of Article III of
the Constitution. Since CSB has suffered no "concrete" or
"certainly impending" injury, they cannot have standing to
sue.
B. This Court Should Follow the Lead of the Eighth and
Eleventh Circuits Which Hold Direct Injurious
Action Must Be Taken in Conjunction with a
Forest Plan Before Article III Standing May Be
Conferred upon a Plaintiff.
A split among five of the circuit courts has developed on
the issue of whether environmental groups have Article III
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol15/iss2/15
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standing to challenge forest management plans such as the
one at issue in this case. The circuit courts finding environ-
mental groups have standing to attack a forest management
plan are the Sixth Circuit in Sierra Club v. Thomas, the Sev-
enth Circuit in Sierra Club v. Marita, and the Ninth Circuit
on a 2-1 decision in Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma
and its progeny. Sierra Club v. Thomas, 105 F.3d 248 (6th
Cir. 1997); Sierra Club v. Marita, 46 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 1995);
Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma, 956 F.2d 1508 (9th
Cir. 1992). The Eighth and Eleventh Circuits, however, have
found environmental groups do not have standing to attack a
forest management plan absent some further showing of a
"concrete and particularized injury." Alcock, 83 F.3d at 386
(no ripe controversy); Sierra Club v. Robertson, 28 F.3d 753,
757-60 (8th Cir. 1994) (no Article III standing).
Both the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits had the opportu-
nity to evaluate the logic contained in the Marita and
Mumma decisions before ruling on the issue of standing.
Both circuits rejected the Marita and Mumma logic on the
ground that no "imminent" or "actual" injury had taken place
as required by the Supreme Court's decision in Defenders.
Alcock, 83 F.3d at 390; Robertson, 28 F.3d at 757-60. This
Court should reject the Marita and Mumma holdings for the
same reason: CSB has suffered no "imminent" or "actual" in-
jury. The Eighth Circuit went so far as to say:
We have difficulty in discerning that a 'concrete and partic-
ularized' injury in fact was alleged in any of the [Ninth Cir-
cuit] cases. We therefore are not persuaded by these
decisions, and we decline to apply them as a basis for find-
ing that the appellants have standing to attack the Plan.
Robertson, 28 F.3d at 759. As the district court stated in Al-
cock: "[T]he Eighth Circuit's opinion in Robertson [is] more
persuasive than that of the Ninth Circuit in Mumma and ac-
cordingly [we] will adopt the Eighth Circuit's decision finding
a lack of standing in a case such as the instant one." Wilder-
ness Soc'y v. Alcock, 867 F. Supp. 1026, 1041 (N.D. Ga. 1994).
Not only is the Robertson opinion summarized above more
persuasive, but it is also more consonant with the Supreme
1998]
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Court's holding in Defenders which requires a "concrete and
particularized injury." Absent further showing by CSB that
it has suffered a "concrete and particularized injury," this
Court must find the rationale adopted by the Eighth and
Eleventh Circuits is proper in light of the Defenders decision
and the "case or controversy" requirements of Article III of
the United States Constitution. In sum, because CSB lacks
an "imminent, concrete, and particularized injury," it also
lacks standing to sue. This Court should dismiss CSB's claim
without reaching the merits.
C. This Matter Is Not Ripe for Adjudication
The notion of ripeness requires a court to ask "whether
this is the correct time for the complainant to bring the ac-
tion." See Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction, § 2.4.1
(1989). In the instant case, the timing of the suit as well as
the propriety of appellants as plaintiffs causes justiciability
problems.
The ripeness doctrine "prevent[s] the courts, through
avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling them-
selves in abstract disagreements over administrative poli-
cies" and requires the decision of the agency to "be felt in a
concrete way by the challenging parties." Abbott Laborato-
ries v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967). Requiring a matter
to be ripe for adjudication "preserves the vitality of the adver-
sarial process by assuring both that the parties before the
court have an actual, as opposed to professed, stake in the
outcome, and that 'the legal questions presented.., will be
resolved, not in the rarified atmosphere of a debating society,
but in a concrete factual context conducive to a realistic ap-
preciation of the consequences of judicial action." Defenders,
504 U.S. at 581 (quoting Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982)).
In this case, the effects of the forest management plan,
and the timber sale itself for that matter, have yet to be felt
by CSB. As the record indicates: "Blackacre has killed no mi-
gratory birds, and there is no proof that Blackacre will kill
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birds in the future." (R. at 3.) The record clearly shows no
"concrete effects" have been felt by CSB, therefore, this Court
should not become entangled in a situation in which no injury
may ever occur. Indeed, this matter is unripe for decision for
the same reasons CSB lacks standing.
Furthermore, "The value of not deciding an issue is af-
fected by... the need to conserve judicial resources, and the
risk that premature decision may be proved unwise." Wilder-
ness Soc'y, 867 F. Supp. at 1043. Our country is entering an
era in which the first generation of forest plans authorized
under the NFMA are coming up for review and revision as
required by federal regulation. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(f)(5) (1996).
Blackacre's review of various government documents found
81 revised forest plans which are scheduled to be released in
the next five years. If past is prologue, many (if not most) of
these revised forest plans will be challenged in court by one
or more environmental groups. This Court's adoption of the
Eighth and Eleventh Circuit Courts' standing and ripeness
rationale is not only consistent with the Constitution and the
Supreme Court's holding in Defenders, but it also would pre-
vent a flood of needless litigation from washing over the fed-
eral courts. Because CSB's claim is not ripe for adjudication,
this Court should dismiss CSB's claim without reaching the
merits.
II. BECAUSE NFMA REVIEW IS AVAILABLE TO
CSB, APA REVIEW IS IMPROPER.
A. Because the NFMA Provides an Adequate Remedy for
CSB, APA Review Is Unavailable.
The APA authorizes judicial review only if there is "no
other adequate remedy in a court." 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1996). In
CSB's case, an alternative remedy is available in the NFMA's
regulatory framework for preserving fish and wildlife re-
sources. 36 C.F.R. pt. 219.19 (1996). This section of the
NFMA provides:
[Wlildlife habitat shall be managed to maintain viable
populations of existing native and desired non-native ver-
tebrate species in the planning area. For planning pur-
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poses, a viable population shall be regarded as one which
has the estimated numbers and distribution of reproduc-
tive individuals to insure [sic] its continued existence is
well distributed in the planning area.
While the above NFMA regulation causes CSB to lose
stake to its claim of APA review, the reasonable result
achieved under NFMA review is desirable for all parties in-
volved. The benefit to CSB is its objective of "protecting the
avian population resident in and migrating through the State
of New Union" is furthered by the NFMA's requirement of a
viable population within the forest planning area. (R. at 2.)
The benefit to Blackacre and the Forest Service is a Solomon-
like compromise is achieved whereby reasonable timber pro-
duction may take place contemporaneously with reasonable
migratory bird protection. The NFMA regulatory standard,
by focusing on biological health at a population level, simply
avoids the absurd results associated with the MBTA stan-
dard previously proffered by CSB; namely, prohibiting all
economic activities resulting in the death of even one migra-
tory bird. See Section III below.
If this Court chooses to adopt CSB's argument -for a
MBTA remedy under which they advocate a zero-tolerance
threshold for bird deaths, such a decision would certainly cre-
ate conflicts between the MBTA and the laws governing na-
tional forests. In addition, one of the main functions of the
national forest management system would be undermined:
timber production. Employing CSB's MBTA remedy would
alter the congressionally-declared mandate that national for-
ests be managed for multiple uses, and would substitute a
philosophy whereby absolute protection of migratory birds
supersedes any use which is even slightly dissonant with
such a scheme.
Moreover, the NFMA remedy which allows for a reason-
able number of incidental bird deaths and protects viable
populations is superior to CSB's claim to a MBTA remedy be-
cause it is biologically impossible to manage a national forest
preserving each bird or maximizing already viable popula-
tions of each migratory bird species. Some migratory bird
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol15/iss2/15
MOOT COURT
species compete more successfully in old-growth habitats.
Different migratory bird species do better in younger-growth
habitats created after timber harvesting and the replanting
required by the NFMA. See 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(e)(ii)
(1996). The biological reality is any forest management
choice, including a Forest Service decision not to sell any tim-
ber rights for logging, inevitably benefits some species and
harms other species:
The Forest Service is charged with managing the ever-
changing resources of the national forests. In the absence
of forest management, trees would grow older, the charac-
ter of plant and animal diversity would change, and some
wildlife species would decline in numbers. Harvesting
trees using even-aged management techniques necessarily
results in younger stands. Wildlife dependent on younger
stands would flourish at the expense of species dependent
on older growth forests . .. These forest dynamics make
clear that protecting forest resources involves making
trade-offs.
Sierra Club v. Espy, 38 F.3d 792, 802 (5th Cir. 1994).
Requiring an environmental plaintiff to seek the proper
remedy under the appropriate substantive Act is not a new
concept. For example, in Defenders v. EPA, the Eighth Cir-
cuit held since "EPA acted under FIFRA, judicial review
should be obtained under the FIFRA framework." Defenders
of Wildlife v. EPA, 882 F.2d 1294, 1302 (8th Cir. 1988). Simi-
larly, this Court should hold since the Forest Service made
the timber sale to Blackacre under the NFMA framework, ju-
dicial review should also be had in the context of the NFMA
framework.
In sum, judicial review of actions taken in conjunction
with a forest plan which affect migratory birds occurs under
the "viable population" framework of the NFMA. This frame-
work provides an adequate remedy which precludes a direct
MBTA claim. The appropriate way of achieving review of the
Forest Service's actions is to challenge those actions under
statutes pursuant to which the Forest Service already has an
affirmative duty to act, such as the NFMA.
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B. In the Alternative, If APA Review is Applied, this
Review Reveals the Forest Service's Timber Sale to
Blackacre was "In Accordance with the Law."
The APA provides in pertinent part: "[A] reviewing court
shall-. . . (2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action...
found to be . . . not in accordance with the law." 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(A) (1996). CSB claims the Forest Service's timber
sale to Blackacre under the NFMA is "not in accordance with
the law" since this sale might eventually result in migratory
bird deaths in violation of the MBTA. (R. at 2.) In this case,
in order for the Forest Service's actions to be "not in accord-
ance with the law," CSB must show: (1) the MBTA has been
violated by the United States Forest Service and, (2) the
MBTA applies to the United States Forest Service. Preferred
Risk Mutual Ins. Co. v. United States, 86 F.3d 789, 792 (8th
Cir. 1996). CSB cannot satisfy either of these two prongs.
1. The MBTA has not been violated by the United
States Forest Service, therefore, the Forest
Service's timber sale to Blackacre was "in
accordance with the law."
As Judge Remus noted in her decision below, "[Tihe For-
est Service has killed no migratory birds, [and] the Forest
Service will kill no migratory birds." (R. at 3.) In addition,
the MBTA is not a strict liability offense as discussed below
in section III. Therefore, the Forest Service could not have
violated any of the MBTA's provisions. Absent a violation of
the MBTA by the Forest Service, its actions are by definition
"in accordance with the law." If the Forest Service's actions
are "in accordance with the law," then APA judicial review, if
applied, must find that the Forest Service's timber sale to
Blackacre was proper.
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2. The MBTA does not apply to the United States
Forest Service, therefore, APA review of the
Forest Service's timber sale to Blackacre is "in
accordance with the law."
The plain language of the MBTA indicates the Act was
not meant to apply to federal actions. The MBTA's prohibi-
tion against "taking" any migratory bird applies only to "any
person, association, partnership, or corporation." 16 U.S.C.
§ 707(a) (1996). Noticeably absent from this list of covered
violators are the terms "sovereign" or "federal agency." Fur-
thermore, the term "person" has consistently been held not to
include the federal government, its agents, or officers. Pre-
ferred Risk, 86 F.3d at 792; United States v. Cooper Corp., 312
U.S. 600, 604 (1941). In sharp contrast, the Endangered Spe-
cies Act, designed to apply to federal actions, defines the term
"person" as "an individual, corporation, partnership... [and]
any officer, employee, agent, department of the Federal Gov-
ernment ... or any other entity subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States." 16 U.S.C. § 1532(13) (1996).
Clearly, the plain language of the MBTA indicates the
United States is not covered by the Act. The resulting chain
of logic, then becomes child's play. If the Forest Service is not
covered by the MBTA, then the Forest Service cannot be in
violation of the Act. If the Forest Service is not in violation of
the Act, then by definition, the Forest Service's actions are "in
accordance with the law." Ultimately, if the MBTA does not
apply to the Forest Service, then its actions are "in accord-
ance with the law" as defined by the MBTA. Because APA
review reveals the Forest Service's timber sale to Blackacre
was "in accordance with the law," then this Court should dis-
miss this action without reaching the merits of CSB's MBTA
claim.
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III. SECTION 703(a) OF THE MIGRATORY BIRD
TREATY ACT SHOULD NOT BE TREATED
AS A STRICT LIABILITY CRIMINAL
PROVISION.
A. The Absence of a Mens Rea Requirement in § 707(a) of
the MBTA Violates the Due Process Clause of the
United States Constitution.
The basic premise that mens rea is required to establish
criminal liability is supported by the Latin maxim "actus non
facit reum nisi mens sit rea (an act does not make one guilty
unless his mind is guilty)." W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIM-
INAL LAW § 3.4, at 212 (1986). It is a deeply-rooted notion in
American law that crime requires the concurrence of an evil-
meaning mind with an evil-doing hand. Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494, 500 (1951). "The existence of a mens rea
is a rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of An-
glo-American criminal jurisprudence." Id.
The mens rea requirement originates in the Due Process
Clause, found in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of
the United States Constitution, which prevents any person
from being deprived of "life, liberty, or property without due
process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V; amend. XIV, § 1.
When a law has the potential to "deprive an individual of lib-
erty," as in this case, courts generally require proof of mens
rea as a component of due process protection. Dennis, 341
U.S. at 501. Section 707(a) of the MBTA allows for individu-
als to be deprived of both liberty and property in that "any
person, association, partnership, or corporation who shall vio-
late or fail to comply with any regulation made pursuant to
this subchapter shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and
upon conviction thereof shall be fined not more than $500 or
be imprisoned not more than six months, or both." 16 U.S.C.
§ 707(a) (1996). For the following reasons, the misdemeanor
penalty provision of the MBTA violates the due process guar-
antees afforded by the United States Constitution.
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1. Because violations of the MBTA are not "public
welfare offenses," mens rea is required under the
Due Process Clause of the United States
Constitution.
Strict liability offenses are "generally disfavored" by the
United States Supreme Court when criminal penalties may
be imposed. Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426
(1985). However, the Supreme Court has held strict liability
criminal offenses are proper when the proscribed conduct is a
"public welfare offense." See, e.g., United States v. Freed, 401
U.S. 601 (1971); United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671 (1975).
Blackacre asserts that an incidental violation of the MBTA is
not a public welfare offense, therefore, mens rea must be re-
quired in order to satisfy the due process guarantees afforded
by the United States Constitution.
Legitimate public welfare offenses have been defined by
the Supreme Court as offenses in which the offender engages
in a "type of conduct that a reasonable person should know is
subject to stringent public regulation and may seriously
threaten the community's health and safety." Liparota, 471
U.S. at 433. The Court has further defined public welfare of-
fenses as offenses which "create the danger or probability of
[immediate injury to person or property] which the law seeks
to minimize." Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 256
(1952). Public welfare offenses have included the sale of im-
pure or adulterated foods or drugs, driving faster than the
speed limit, the sale of intoxicating liquor to minors, im-
proper handling of dangerous chemicals or nuclear wastes,
and the possession of certain illegal weapons. See, e.g.,
United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975) (sale of contami-
nated food); United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943)
(sale of mislabeled drugs); United States v. Int'l Minerals &
Chemical Corp., 402 U.S. 558 (1971) (transportation of dan-
gerous liquids or products); United States v. Johnson & Tow-
ers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984) (dumping of hazardous
wastes); United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971) (posses-
sion of illegal hand grenades).
19981 889
23
890 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15
The obvious rationale for these strict liability public wel-
fare offenses is to protect the public from grave and imminent
harm. Freed, 401 U.S. at 609. Clearly, each of the aforemen-
tioned examples of legitimate public welfare offenses pose a
grave danger to our society. Blackacre has no quarrel with
legitimate strict liability public welfare regulations when the
clearly demonstrated objective is to protect society from grave
and imminent danger. The important purpose of protecting
society from grave and imminent danger is certainly fur-
thered by their existence, and they have been consistently up-
held under constitutional review on these grounds. See, e.g.,
United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922).
However, violations of the MBTA do not rise to the level
of "dangerousness" found in traditional public welfare of-
fenses. While incidental violations of the MBTA may result
in some aesthetic diminishment of our environment, viola-
tions of the aforementioned examples of traditional public
welfare regulations result in dramatically increased highway
deaths, a poisoned food supply, and spilled nuclear waste.
See generally, Laurie L. Levenson, Good Faith Defenses: Re-
shaping Strict Liability Crimes, 78 Cornell L. Rev. 401 (1993)
(discussing the requirement of dangerousness in public wel-
fare offenses). The huge disparity in the societal impact of
violations of the MBTA versus violations of drug labeling
laws or laws governing the handling of nuclear waste speaks
volumes about the MBTA's classification as a regulation
outside the purview of traditional public welfare regulations.
See generally, Dennis Jenkins, Criminal Prosecution and the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act: An Analysis of the Constitution
and Criminal Intent in an Environmental Context, 24 B.C.
Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 595 (1997) (discussing activities which do
not threaten the greater public with imminent harm as being
inappropriately classified as public welfare offenses).
Applying this logic of comparative dangerousness, the
Liparota Court refused to lump together the potentially inno-
cent violator of food stamp regulations with the criminally
dangerous possessor of hand grenades. Liparota, 471 U.S. at
426. This Court should follow the Liparota Court's lead in
recognizing the unacceptable due process implications of
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grouping non-public welfare regulations together with legiti-
mate public welfare regulations. Because causing the death
of a migratory bird poses no grave danger to the public, the
MBTA cannot be deemed a public welfare regulation. Indi-
viduals who inadvertently violate the MBTA's provisions
should not be held to the same standard as individuals who
threaten our society with grave and imminent harm. While
due process rights may legitimately be relegated to the back
seat in order to protect society from grave danger, the notion
of Americans sacrificing their constitutional rights to save a
bird's egg or its abandoned nest should be rejected by this
Court.
2. The harsh penalties imposed under § 707(a) of the
MBTA require a mens rea component in order to
satisfy the due process guarantees afforded
under the United States Constitution.
Strict liability criminal convictions violate the Due Pro-
cess Clause when the attached penalties are "relatively large"
or "gravely besmirch" the defendant's reputation. See, e.g.,
Holdridge v. United States, 282 F.2d 302, 310 (8th Cir. 1960);
United States v. Wulff, 758 F.2d 1121, 1125 (6th Cir. 1985).
The vast body of jurisprudence on this issue sets forth neither
a clear line of demarcation between "relatively large penal-
ties" and "relatively small penalties," nor between penalties
which "gravely besmirch" and penalties which "do not gravely
besmirch" an individual's reputation. Morissette, 342 U.S. at
260. However, the penalties which may be imposed for mis-
demeanor violations of the MBTA clearly qualify as "rela-
tively large" and "gravely besmirching."
With respect to the threshold at which a criminal penalty
becomes "relatively large," it has been stated:
[11f the offense be punishable by imprisonment, the indi-
vidual interest of the defendant weighs too heavily to allow
conviction without proof of a guilty mind. To subject de-
fendants entirely free from moral blameworthiness to the
possibility of prison sentences is revolting to the commu-
nity sense of justice; and no law which violates this funda-
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mental instinct can long endure. Crimes punishable with
prison sentences, therefore, ordinarily require proof of a
guilty intent.
Morissette, 342 U.S. at 260 (quoting 2 POLLOK &
MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 465). By at-
taching a prison sentence of up to six months to a violation of
the MBTA, § 707(a) clearly meets the Morissette test set forth
above for a "relatively large penalty." Moreover, there is es-
pecially convincing evidence in the legislative history of the
MBTA that the penalties in § 707(a) were intended to be in-
terpreted as extremely harsh penalties. For example, Con-
gressman Graham stated:
[T]his section provides a penalty of $500 or an imprison-
ment of not more than six months for a violation of any of
the provisions of this act, or any of the regulations that
may be issued from time to time by the Department of Ag-
riculture. You will observe that it is a rather severe pen-
alty for the infraction of any game law.
56 CONG. REC. 7452 (June 6, 1918) (statement of Rep. Gra-
ham) (emphasis added). Furthermore, Congressman John-
son added: "[Individuals] should not be subjected to a penalty
as extreme as $500 or an imprisonment for six months, or
both." 56 CONG. REC. 7457 (June 6, 1918) (statement of
Rep. Johnson of Washington) (emphasis added). Congress-
man Dempsey also pointed out the severity of the penalties of
§ 707(a) by noting: "[E]very innocent boy who goes out to
play upon the streets and breaks a bird's egg through acci-
dent is to be haled 500 miles away and punished as if he were
committing an offense of the highest degree, and with all the
rigors of the criminal law." 56 CONG. REC. 7456 (June 6,
1918) (statement of Rep. Dempsey). Clearly, Congress inter-
preted the misdemeanor penalties of § 707(a) the MBTA as
"relatively large penalties."
This language aside, the judiciary has failed to succinctly
demarcate the point at which penalties become "relatively
large." Through constructive analysis, however, the line be-
tween "relatively large" and "relatively small" becomes dis-
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cernible. In Wulff, the felony provisions of the MBTA were
deemed to be violative of the Due Process Clause because the
felony provisions of the MBTA "were not, in the court's mind,
a relatively small penalty." Wulff, 758 F.2d at 1125 (quoting
United States v. St. Pierre, 578 F. Supp. 1424, 1429 (D.S.D.
1983)). A mere three years later, in United States v. Engler,
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals concluded: "the differ-
ences between the objective penalties of the misdemeanor
and felony provisions of the Act is [sic], for due process pur-
poses, de minimis." United States v. Engler, 806 F.2d 425,
434 (3d Cir. 1986).
The resulting logic in comporting Wulff and Engler may
be reduced to the simplicity of a logical proof. If we are given
in Wulff that the felony provision of the MBTA is violative of
due process, and if it is further given in Engler that the pen-
alties of the felony and misdemeanor provisions of the MBTA
are substantially the same, then the obvious conclusion is
that the misdemeanor provision of the MBTA, like its sub-
stantially similar felony counterpart, is also violative of due
process. While this analysis wins the portion of the battle
which deems the penalties under § 707(a) to be "relatively
large" in nature, we now turn to the question of whether
these penalties "gravely besmirch" one's reputation.
In 1986, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit struggled with the question of when a penalty
"gravely besmirches" an individual's reputation in the con-
text of an MBTA prosecution. Engler, 806 F.2d at 434. In
frustration, the Engler court stated: "We would ... be more
comfortable if empirical data from psychologists and sociolo-
gists were present in the record in this case to furnish gui-
dance as to when the grave danger to an offender's reputation
does or does not attach." Id.
This Court need not require cold empirical data in order
to hold a $500 fine and six months in a federal prison would
"gravely besmirch" an individual's reputation. Certainly no
member of the bar, nor bench for that matter, would claim a
six-month stint in a federal prison would be easily wiped from
the consciousness of her peers or her reputation as a member
of the legal community. This terrible stain on an individual's
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reputation is certainly an irreparable one. Indeed, even the
prosecution in the Engler case conceded the absence of a
mens rea requirement in the MBTA was violative of due pro-
cess. Id. at 433.
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should hold the
misdemeanor penalty provisions contained in § 707(a) of the
MBTA are "relatively large penalties" which "gravely be-
smirch" an individual's reputation. Furthermore, this Court
should hold these penalties may not be imposed without mens
rea under the Due Process Clause of the United States
Constitution.
3. The government's notion of "selective prosecution"
of MBTA violations is an insufficient protection
of Due Process rights under the United States
Constitution.
The government has taken the position that Due Process
rights will not be violated when the offender has innocently
violated the MBTA, because federal prosecutors maintain
"unfettered discretion" in determining whether to prosecute
violations of the MBTA (R. at 3.) The government contends
this notion of "prosecutorial discretion" will prevent compa-
nies like Blackacre from losing the protection afforded them
under the Due Process Clause. However, Blackacre asserts
the federal government should not be allowed to pretend it is
the benevolent guardian of due process rights. Prosecutorial
discretion is an unconstitutionally arbitrary exercise of gov-
ernmental authority and should not be allowed by this Court.
This Court should adopt reasoning similar to the court in
United States v. Kantor who held: "[I]f law enforcement offi-
cials could always be trusted to do the right thing, there need
never have been a Bill of Rights." United States v. Kantor,
677 F. Supp. 1421, 1435 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
The United States Supreme Court has stated the Due
Process Clause protects citizens from the arbitrary exercise of
governmental power. Minder v. Georgia, 183 U.S. 559, 562
(1902). The notion of prosecutorial discretion, however, is by
definition, an arbitrary exercise of governmental power.
"While some prosecutor's offices follow strict guidelines based
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upon an objective criteria, others are guided by nothing more
than the personal predilections of the attorney assigned to
the case." Timothy Lynch, Polluting Our Principles: Envi-
ronmental Prosecutions and the Bill of Rights, 15 Temp.
Envtl. L. & Tech. J. 161 (Fall 1996). A Los Angeles County
prosecutor for example, says the decision of whether to indict
a company depends on how the violation affects his neck
hairs. Leslie Spencer, Designated Inmates, FORBES, Oct. 26,
1992, at 100. He says: "When the little hairs on the back of
your neck stand up, it's a felony. When it just makes you tin-
gle, it's a misdemeanor. If it does nothing to you at all, it's a
civil problem." Id. The situation is so obviously rotten, even
many (perhaps more enlightened) prosecutors concede "there
is simply too much uncertainty in environmental law." Wil-
liam P. Kucewicz, Crime and Punishment, ECO, June 1993,
at 54 (quoting Massachusetts Attorney General Scott
Harshbarger).
Furthermore, it is no secret many prosecutors harbor
ambitions for higher office. Those individuals might allow
public opinion and potential media coverage to affect their de-
cision to prosecute a "big, bad logging company" in return for
a few votes and some face time on the local news. In addition,
detailed prosecution records are kept by many prosecutor's
offices including the office's "batting average." Joseph F.
Lawless, Jr., PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 26, § 1.29
(1985). Without question, the allure of a guaranteed convic-
tion under a strict liability statute may cause prosecutors to
attempt to improve their conviction fates by prosecuting an
otherwise innocent individual under the MBTA.
Blackacre contends the wielding of such tremendous gov-
ernmental power ought not be determined by this random
and arbitrary methodology. It is the duty of this Court to
hold prosecutorial discretion will not suffice as protection
against due process violations when no mens rea exists. In
Blackacre's situation, the government has stated it will de-
cide whether to prosecute Blackacre for any incidental bird
deaths which may arise only after timber harvesting opera-
tions commence. (R. at 4.) Meanwhile, Blackacre is at the
mercy of a federal prosecutor's predilections, her political as-
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pirations, and perhaps even her neck hairs. This Court must
not allow such injustice to stand since Blackacre is entitled to
"fair notice of what constitutes illegal conduct" so it may have
"reasonable notice of what conduct is prohibited so that it
may act accordingly." See, e.g., United States v. Dahlstrom,
713 F.2d 1423, 1427 (9th Cir. 1983); Colten v. Kentucky, 407
U.S. 104, 110 (1972); Connally v. General Construction Co.,
269 U.S. 385 (1926). "Private citizens who want to take ...
[ordinary] actions that might cause the death of a single mi-
gratory bird, like cutting down a tree or mowing a field,
[should not be forced to] take their chances with the govern-
ment's prosecutorial discretion." Mahler v. United States
Forest Service, 927 F. Supp. 1559, 1579 (S.D. Ind. 1996). The
United States Supreme Court has long held: "[N]o individual
[may] be forced to speculate at his peril of indictment
whether his conduct is prohibited." Dunn v. United States,
442 U.S. 100, 104 (1926). Any statute which fails to give fair
notice of prohibited conduct "violates the first essential of due
process of law." Connally, 269 U.S. at 389 (1926).
B. Congressional Intent As to the Absence of a Mens Rea
Requirement in § 707(a) of the MBTA is Sufficiently
Vague and Ambiguous to Cause the Rule of Lenity
to Be Applied.
Congress addressed the absence of a mens rea component
in the misdemeanor provision of the MBTA by adding a mens
rea requirement to the MBTA's felony provision in 1986 stat-
ing: "Nothing in this amendment is intended to alter the
'strict liability' standard for misdemeanor prosecutions under
16 U.S.C. § 707(a), a standard which has been upheld in
many Federal [sic] court decisions." S. Rep. No. 99-445, at 16
(1986) reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6113, 6128. However,
this statement is not remarkable for what it does say, rather,
it is remarkable for what it does not say. This statement does
not say: "We intend for the misdemeanor provision to be a
strict liability provision." Instead, it essentially says: "The
amendment to the felony provision is not intended to affect
the status quo of federal prosecutions under the misde-
meanor provision." Albeit a narrow distinction, this language
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was clearly meant to give guidance to federal prosecutors who
may have been uncertain as to how Congress's amendment to
the felony provision could affect their current and future
cases under the MBTA's misdemeanor provision. The state-
ment of the 99th Congress sends a clear message to federal
prosecutors, but it also sends a terribly unclear message to
those attempting to determine whether Congress intended
for the misdemeanor provision to have been a strict liability
provision in the first place.
Furthermore, recent evidence exists supporting the prop-
osition which suggests Congress never intended for the mis-
demeanor provision of the MBTA to be a strict liability
provision. As recently as 1997, Senator Breaux testified
before the House Subcommittee on Fisheries, Conservation,
Wildlife, and Oceans: "A doctrine has developed in the fed-
eral courts by which the intent or knowledge of a person
hunting migratory birds.., is not an issue." Migratory Bird
Treaty Reform Act: Hearings on H.R. 741 Before the Sub-
comm. on Fisheries, Conservation, Wildlife, and Oceans,
105th Cong. 1 (1997) (testimony of Sen. Breaux) (emphasis
added). Senator Breaux's testimony implicates the federal
courts ,and presumably its prosecutors, as being responsible
for developing the strict liability doctrine under § 707(a) of
the MBTA, and not the 99th Congress or any of its state-
ments in amending the MBTA. Because of interpretory am-
biguity, this Court may also turn to the intent of the
Congress which enacted the original provision to determine
whether its intentions are clearly set forth.
Unfortunately, the 65th Congress was no more enlight-
ening than the 99th Congress on the issue of whether the
omission of mens rea was intentional. In fact, the court in
United States v. Wulff, scrutinized the Congressional Record
and determined the 65th Congress's omission of mens rea in
the MBTA was "quite likely... due to oversight." Wulff, 758
F.2d at 1124 n.1. Indeed, throughout the entire congres-
sional debate regarding the enactment of the MBTA in 1918,
the issue of mens rea was mentioned only briefly as an aside
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by just one Congressman.' While the members of the 65th
Congress should be commended for their work during a diffi-
cult time in our Nation's history, the congressional record in-
dicates the pressing matters of
World War I caused careful and deliberate consideration of
the MBTA to take a back seat to the consideration of war
measures. 2 It should come as no surprise Congress could
overlook such one of the most important provisions of a crimi-
nal statute: its requisite mental state. It was this type of leg-
islative oversight which prompted then-Judge Scalia to quote
Otto von Bismarck, lamenting: "Reading [through the con-
gressional record] transcript reminds one of an observation
* . .those who love law and sausages should see neither of
them being made." Community Nutrition Inst. v. Block, 749
F.2d 50, 51 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
Having established the 99th Congress was excessively
vague as to its intent regarding the actual construction of the
statute, and having also established the 65th Congress omit-
ted mens rea due to oversight, the Court should then turn to
the question of how to resolve this matter of statutory inter-
1. "What are you going to do in a case like this: A barefoot boy, as barefoot
boys sometimes do, largely through inadvertence and without meaning anything
wrong, happens to throw a stone... and strikes and injures a robin's nest and
breaks one of the eggs..." 56 CONG. REC. 7455 (June 6, 1918) (statement of
Rep. Mondell) (emphasis added). This reference to mens rea was made during
banter with another Congressman during the debate. No serious discussion of
mens rea took place throughout the entire MBTA debate.
2. "Mr. Chairman, we are spending valuable time that might be devoted to
a more useful purpose. The U-boats are now barking and biting at our doors,
and our boys are confronting the Hindenburg line in Europe and the great bat-
tle of the centuries is on; and yet we are spending [time] passing a measure
protecting meadow larks and woodpeckers." 56 CONG. REC. 7446 (June 6,
1918) (statement of Rep. Tillman); "Now..., with the fact that it is a good thing
to protect the birds of the country, why can not we in a most momentous time
like this legislate promptly and expeditiously, and let the measure for the resti-
tution and rehabilitation of the injured and maimed human life take its place
before the House? [Applause]" 56 CONG. REC. 7456 (June 6, 1918) (statement
of Rep. Dempsey) (emphasis added); "I had understood that the legislation of
this session was to be confined to war measures and that nothing was to be
done to interfere with the consummation of that kind of legislation. I [doubt]
whether it is claimed that the prevention of the shooting of birds out of season
is a war measure... We have a great deal of work to do." 55 CONG. REC. 4399
(June 28, 1917) (statement of Sen. Dempsey).
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pretation absent any clear guidance from Congress. The
Supreme Court has held when the proper application of a
criminal statute is unclear, and congressional intent on the
matter is also unclear, the court should apply the "rule of len-
ity." United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S.
422, 444-45 (1978). The rule of lenity provides that where
there is ambiguity in the language of a criminal statute, am-
biguity should be resolved in favor of the more lenient inter-
pretation. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 902 (6th ed. 1990).
Therefore, proper application of the rule of lenity to the mis-
demeanor provision of the MBTA would require this Court
hold, absent clear guidance from Congress to the contrary,
mens rea should be a requisite component of § 707(a) of the
MBTA for any conviction to be proper.
For the aforementioned reasons, this Court should inter-
pret the misdemeanor provision of the MBTA as requiring
mens rea. Specifically, this Court should follow the lead of
the enlightened Fifth Circuit which, in the face of ambiguous
congressional intent, requires a minimum level of mens rea
as a necessary element under the misdemeanor provision of
the MBTA, subsequently applying the more lenient "knew or
should have known" standard. See, e.g., United States v.
Delahoussaye, 573 F.2d 910, 913 (5th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Sylvester, 848 F.2d 520, 522 (5th Cir. 1988).
C. Significant Public Policy Concerns Dictate the
Requirement of a Mens Rea Component Under
§ 707(a) of the MBTA.
The United States Supreme Court has held: "In deter-
mining the scope of a statute, absurd results are to be
avoided." See, e.g., Trans Alaska Pipeline Rate Cases, 436
U.S. 631, 643 (1978); Comm'r v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563, 571
(1965); United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64,
68 (1994); Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504,
509 (1989); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580
(1981). Additionally, the Court has stated:
[Firequently words of general meaning are used in a stat-
ute, words broad enough to include an act in question, and
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yet a consideration of the whole legislation, or of the cir-
cumstances surrounding its enactment, or of the absurd re-
sults which follow from giving such broad meaning to the
words, makes it unreasonable to believe that the legislator
intended to include the particular act.
Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459
(1892). Clearly, the strict liability criminal prosecution of in-
cidental violations of the MBTA has the potential to produce
absurd results which Congress could not have intended. For
example, one could imagine a situation in which a migratory
bird is accidentally struck and killed on the highway by a
member of Citizens to Save the Birds or another environmen-
tal protection group. Under the government and CSB's rea-
soning, this individual is subject to a strict liability criminal
prosecution, and would be subject to penalties of up to a $500
fine and six months in prison. This result is clearly classified
as absurd and should not be allowed to stand by this Court.
"Certainly construction [of the MBTA] that would bring
every killing within the statute, such as deaths caused by
automobiles, airplanes, plate glass modern office buildings, or
picture windows in residential dwellings into which birds fly,
would offend reason and common sense." United States v.
FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902, 905 (2d Cir. 1978). As the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals held in Catlett, "[r]endering criminal
conviction an unavoidable occasional consequence of [every-
day activities] would serve to deny [these everyday activities]
to those such as, say judges who might find such an occa-
sional consequence unacceptable." United States v. Catlett,
747 F.2d 1102, 1105 (5th Cir. 1984). If this Court determines
the misdemeanor provision of the MBTA is a strict liability
criminal offense, not only would such a holding produce "ab-
surd results" contrary to the intent of the United States
Supreme Court, but it would also induce virtual paranoia in
any person who cares about the effect such "occasional conse-
quences" would have upon their reputation.
Keeping with the example of judges set forth in the Cat-
lett case, such a judge would be loathe to drive a car for fear of
hitting a bird covered by the Act, pilot an airplane for fear of
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such a bird being caught in the propeller, or even have win-
dows in his home for fear of a migratory bird striking the
pane and being killed. Under the interpretation of § 707(a)
proffered by the government and CSB, the individual in each
of these examples would instantly be branded a federal crimi-
nal, be subjected to all of the penalties set forth therein, and
would suffer the shame and humiliation of facing a federal
prosecution for her "crime."
These harsh results are not the product of fanciful con-
jecture. In fact, quite the contrary is true, for ruinous exam-
ples abound. Consider the example of Mr. Mark Cobb, whose
situation was recently brought to the attention of the United
States House of Representatives by Congressman Don
Young, an advocate of the "known or should have known"
standard for the misdemeanor provision of the MBTA. Mr.
Cobb was taking part in a charity dove hunt when he was
arrested, prosecuted, and convicted of violating the misde-
meanor provision of the MBTA for "baiting" under the strict
liability standard. Congressman Young's testimony before
the Subcommittee on Fisheries, Conservation, Wildlife, and
Oceans regarding Mr. Cobb's situation reads as follows:
It was also wrong for our government to ruin the military
career of Mark Cobb, a University of Florida student who
was fined by the Service in the Cross City [charity] Dove
Hunt. Mark paid his $250 fine, after erroneously being
told this was a minor infraction - like a speeding ticket -
and would not be part of his permanent record. Since then,
Mark has lost his ROW scholarship and forever has a fed-
eral criminal record. For what it's worth, Mark has stated
that "I know what bait is illegal and saw none where I
hunted."
Migratory Bird Treaty Reform Act: Hearings on H.R. 741
Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries, Conservation, Wildlife,
and Oceans, 105th Cong. 3 (1997) (testimony of Rep. Young).
Clearly, this result is absurd at best, and is repugnant to the
traditional notions of fairness and justice which are of para-
mount importance to our society and judicial system at worst.
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Furthermore, given the prolixity of the list of covered
birds and the enigmatic nature of the statute itself, a situa-
tion is created in which no reasonable person, let alone the
simple Saturday morning hunter, can possibly be held re-
sponsible for each and every minutiae of the entire MBTA. A
criminal statute must define the offense with "sufficient defi-
niteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct
is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbi-
trary and discriminatory enforcement." Kolender v. Lawson,
461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983). Indeed, the MBTA certainly quali-
fies as an environmental law which environmental lawyers
cannot easily decipher.3 Such a sorry situation tugs at the
very threads of the cloth of a free society. James Madison
noted: "[it will be of little avail to the people that the laws
are made by men of their own choice if the laws be so volumi-
nous that they cannot be read, or so incoherent that they can-
not be understood . . ." The Federalist No. 62, at 287-88
(James Madison) (Hallowell, 1852).
In fact, no bird death even need occur for an individual to
be prosecuted under the strict liability standard. For exam-
ple, under § 705 of the MBTA which prevents disturbing the
abandoned nests of migratory birds, the family who takes
their Christmas tree home to their living room with part of an
abandoned warbler's nest inside may be spending their holi-
day in a federal prison under the government and CSB's in-
terpretation of § 707(a). Indeed, under the government and
CSB's interpretation, the chairperson of the Migratory Bird
Conservation Commission appointed under § 715(a) of the
MBTA is subject to strict liability criminal prosecution if she
files her annual report to Congress one day late in violation of
3. In a recent survey, 47 percent of 200 environmental attorneys inter-
viewed said the environmental duty which occupied most of their time and en-
ergy was trying to determine the seemingly basic question of whether their
clients were complying with the law. Marianne Lavelle, Environmental Vise:
Law, Compliance, In Companies Staff Up and Struggle to Stay Ahead of the
Green Machine, Nat'l L. J., Aug. 30, 1993, at 1. (The referenced survey was
performed by Arthur Andersen Environmental Services and National Law
Journal.) "Nearly 70 percent [of the attorneys surveyed] said they didn't be-
lieve total compliance with the law was ever achievable- due to the complexity
of the law..." Id.
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§ 715(b). That is, the chairperson would qualify as a person
who, according to the government and CSB, "shall [have] vio-
late[d] any provision ... of this subchapter ... or fail [ed] to
have compl[ied] with this subchapter," and be subject to strict
liability criminal prosecution under § 707(a) of the MBTA. 16
U.S.C. § 707(a) (1996). Regarding the complexity of the
MBTA, chances are, even the chairperson if asked, would
concede she is unaware she is subject to strict liability federal
prosecution for filing her report a day late, having never
caused the death of a single migratory bird.
This Court should take a stand against such ridiculous
results. "In its zeal to stamp out pollution, the federal gov-
ernment has assumed extraordinary police and prosecutorial
powers over the citizenry. The growing threat to civil liber-
ties is frightfully real." Lynch, supra at 192. Furthermore,
the government and CSB's interpretation of § 707(a) of the
MBTA makes a mockery of our judicial system by creating a
situation in which total compliance is impossible, innocent
citizens are jailed, and absurd results abound. Because of the
aforementioned absurdities, public policy dictates this Court
should follow the United States Supreme Court's decisions in
Trans Alaska, X-Citement Video, and Bock Laundry in which
the Court held such absurd results cannot be allowed to
stand. Trans Alaska, 436 U.S. at 643; X-Citement Video, Inc.,
513 U.S. at 66; Bock Laundry, 490 U.S. at 509.
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IV. THE MIGRATORY BIRD TREATY ACT DOES
NOT PROHIBIT MIGRATORY BIRD DEATHS
CAUSED BY HARVESTING TIMBER
DURING THE NESTING SEASON.
A. The Plain Language of the Statute Indicates the MBTA
Should Not Be Applied to Timber Harvesting
Activities.
1. The terms "take" and "kill" as contained in § 703 of
the MBTA are not applicable to incidental deaths
of migratory birds caused by timber harvesting
activities.
The MBTA makes it "unlawful at any time, by any
means or in any manner, to pursue, hunt, take, capture, or
kill . . . any migratory bird." 16 U.S.C. § 703 (1996). The
term "take" is further defined as to "pursue, hunt, shoot,
wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect." 50 C.F.R. § 10.12
(1996). These active words describe "physical conduct of the
sort engaged in by hunters and poachers." Seattle Audubon
Soc'y v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297, 302 (9th Cir. 1991). Such active
verbs do not pertain to any aspect of timber harvesting.
"[Tihe words 'take' and 'kill' were used in a context that
clearly focused on hunting, trapping, and poaching." 46 Fed.
Reg. 29,491 (June 2, 1981) (Department of the Interior legal
opinion that, under its common meaning, "take" should "in-
clude only those actions that are directed against individual
wildlife.")
As a result of the active words Congress chose to use in
drafting the MBTA, the Ninth Circuit held the MBTA does
not reach timber harvesting activities. Evans, 952 F.2d at
302-03. The Evans court held even the broadest MBTA read-
ing "do[es] not suggest that habitat [modification], leading in-
directly to bird deaths, amounts to the 'taking' of migratory
birds with the meaning of the MBTA." Id. As the court noted
in Sierra Club v. Martin, a "taking does not occur simply be-
cause of habitat.., modification." Sierra Club v. Martin, 933
F. Supp. 1559 (N.D. Ga. 1996).
This narrow interpretation was also adopted by the court
in Citizens Interested in Bull Run v. Edrington. Citizens In-
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terested in Bull Run v. Edrington, 781 F. Supp. 1502 (D. Or.
1991). In Bull Run, the court refused to "take the plaintiffs'
bait" of an expansive reading of the MBTA stating: "attempts
to expand the definition of a 'taking' under the MBTA have
been rejected by at least two other district courts." See Bull
Run, 781 F. Supp. at 1510; Headwaters v. Lujan, Civ. No. 87-
1160-FR, 1991 WL 81838 (D. Or. May 8, 1991); Seattle Audu-
bon Soc'y v. Robertson, No. C89-160-WD, 1991 WL 180099
(W.D. Wash. March 7, 1991). The Bull Run court properly
determined, as this Court should, the MBTA "was intended to
apply to individual hunters and poachers," and not to loggers
as CSB argues. Bull Run v. Edrington, 781 F. Supp. at 1506.
Furthermore, neither the MBTA nor its companion regu-
lations include the term "harm" within the definition of
"take." However, "harm" does appear in the definition of
"take" in the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA). 16
U.S.C. § 1532(19) (1996). This is significant since the word
"harm," and that word only, has been defined expansively to
include wildlife injuries which occur through habitat modifi-
cation. Absent the word "harm," the MBTA cannot be applied
to habitat modification. The Supreme Court has stated:
The statutory context of 'harm' suggests that Congress
meant [for harm'] to serve a particular function in the
ESA, consistent with but distinct from the functions of the
other verbs used to define 'take.' The secretary's interpre-
tation of 'harm' to include indirectly injuring endangered
animals through habitat modification permissibly inter-
prets 'harm' to have 'a character of its own not to be sub-
merged by its association.'
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Greater
Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 695 (1995) (quoting Russell Motor Car
Co., v. United States, 261 U.S. 514, 519 (1923)).
In addition, "[T]he differences in the proscribed conduct
under the ESA and MBTA are distinct and purposeful." Ev-
ans, 952 F.2d at 302-03. It is important to note, after the
ESA was enacted, Congress amended the MBTA in 1974 and
1989, but did not add the word "harm" to the MBTA. This
further buttresses the argument indicating the absence of the
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word "harm" in the MBTA is intentional and, therefore, the
inapplicability of the MBTA to habitat modification is also in-
tentional. As the court noted in Sierra Club v. USDA: "This
is strong evidence that the MBTA does not include a prohibi-
tion of habitat modification or degradation." Sierra Club v.
USDA, 116 F.3d 1482, 1997 WL 295308 (7th Cir. 1997).
2. The terms "by any means" and "in any manner" as
contained in § 703 of the MBTA are not
applicable to incidental deaths of migratory
birds caused by timber harvesting activities.
When taken:out of context, the terms "by any means" and
"in any manner" appear to be convincing evidence indicating
land uses which cause the incidental death of a migratory
bird may be prohibited by the MBTA. However, as the
United States Supreme Court has consistently held: "a stat-
ute should be read as a whole to interpret its plain meaning."
See, e.g., Beecham v. United States, 511 U.S. 368, 371-72
(1994). To limit the analysis of the MBTA to these two iso-
lated phrases is reminiscent of the strikingly appropriate ca-
veat which warns against failing to see the forest for the
trees. A statutory phrase (such as "by any means") which
suggests a broad construction "is not an invitation to apply
[the Act] to new purposes that Congress never intended."
Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 183 (1993). When in-
terpreted as a whole, the MBTA clearly should not be applied
to incidental bird deaths caused by timber harvesting
activities.
In the 80 years since the enactment of the MBTA, there
has not been a single recorded government prosecution alleg-
ing timber harvesting or other non-ultrahazardous land uses
violate the MBTA's "by any means" language. Yet the Dis-
trict Court has chosen to enlarge the MBTA to include such
activities absent any evidence of legislative authority to do so.
Blackacre submits the correct interpretation of the MBTA is
the one endorsed by the Mahler court which held:
The better reading of the statute is to find that the prohibi-
tions apply only to activity that is intended to kill or cap-
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ture birds or to traffic in their bodies and parts... [Tihis
court does not believe that an 80 year old statute is prop-
erly interpreted for the first time to effectively prohibit
[timber harvesting] activity that has gone on apace during
the entire time the statute has been on the books.
Mahler, 927 F. Supp. at 1583.
Furthermore, the MBTA provides for "special purpose"
permits to be issued by the Forest Service before the other-
wise illegal "taking" of migratory birds "by any means" may
become proper. 16 U.S.C. § 712(2) (1996); Migratory Bird
Permits, 50 C.F.R. §§ 13, 20, and 21 (1995). These permits
are issued for purposes of taxidermy (§ 21.24), scientific study
(§ 21.23), and banding (§ 21.22). See 50 C.F.R. § 21 (1995).
Noticeably absent are regulations allowing permits for timber
harvesting, farming, flying airplanes, and other activities not
directed at wildlife. Because timber harvesting is not covered
as an "activity for which a permit is required," this suggests
the MBTA only prohibits activities which are directed at
wildlife, not deaths caused literally "by any means" as CSB
argues. Activity for Which a Permit is Required, 50 C.F.R.
§ 13.1 (1995). Considering the aforementioned factors, this
Court should hold incidental deaths caused by timber har-
vesting are not violative of the MBTA's "by any means" lan-
guage since these deaths are not directed at wildlife.
B. The Legislative History of the MBTA Indicates
Congress Did Not Intend for the MBTA to Apply to
Timber Harvesting Activities.
The 65th Congress was very clear about the intended
reach and scope of the MBTA. The congressional record con-
clusively indicates the MBTA was not intended to apply to
timber harvesting. As Senator Smith stated during floor de-
bate, the MBTA is intended to do "[nothing] ... except to keep
pothunters from killing game out of season [and] ruining the
eggs of nesting birds." 55 CONG. REC. 4402 (June 28, 1917)
(statement of Sen. Smith). Ample evidence exists supporting
the proposition indicating hunters, not loggers, were the tar-
get of the MBTA for the "improvement of guns have [sic] been
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such that [migratory birds] can be reached in all places, and
they are slaughtered promiscuously." 56 CONG. REC. 7370
(June 4, 1918) (statement of Rep. Baker). Congressman Fess
also confirmed the MBTA was aimed at the "market hunter,"
and not at the timber industry as CSB argues. 56 CONG.
REC. 7357 (June 4, 1918) (statement of Rep. Fess).
Furthermore, much of the debate in Congress sur-
rounded the issue of whether federal officials could conduct
searches of farms and houses for birds which had been
poached by hunters. See, e.g., 56 CONG. REC. 7356-81 (June
4, 1918); 56 CONG. REC. 7472-76 (June 7, 1918). No legisla-
tor suggested the MBTA was meant to inhibit land uses such
as timber harvesting which might incidentally cause the
death of a migratory bird. In fact, quite the contrary is true.
One of the main functions of the MBTA was to protect timber
harvesting interests by allowing migratory birds to curb the
number of timber-eating insects, thereby protecting valuable
timber resources. 4 In fact, the American Forestry Association
heartily endorsed the passage of the MBTA, and was one of
the driving forces in favor of its enactment stating in a resolu-
tion adopted by their membership:
[Tihe American Forestry Association respectfully urges the
present Congress to make effective, through the necessary
legislative action, the recently ratified convention between
the United States and Great Britain for the protection of
useful migratory birds.
Speedy action is desirable in view of the increasing
economic loss to all the people which must ensue if action
be deferred until the next Congress.
56 CONG. REC. 7357 (June 28, 1918). If the MBTA was in-
tended to impede timber harvesting activities as CSB argues,
the American Forestry Association certainly would not have
given the legislation such a ringing endorsement. Thus, as
4. "[Annual losses of] natural-forest products [attributable to insects], ap-
proximately estimated, [are] $100 million." 56 CONG. REC. 7357 (June 4,
1918) (statement of Rep. Fess); "[Tihe protection of the insectivorous migratory
birds is essential to the preservation of our... timber crop." 56 CONG. REC.
7360-61 (June 4, 1918) (statement of Rep. Stedman).
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the United States Supreme Court noted early in the history
of the MBTA, the preservation of agriculture and valuable
timber interests was the ultimate objective of the MBTA, not
the restriction of timber harvesting activities as CSB urges.
Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 431, 435 (1920). If Con-
gress had intended for the MBTA to apply to incidental bird
deaths caused during ordinary land uses such as timber har-
vesting, it would have expressed its intent as such. As the
court stated in United States v. Rollins: "Such specificity
would not have been difficult to draft into the statute."
United States v. Rollins, 706 F. Supp. 742, 744-45 (D. Idaho
1989). This Court should follow the intent of Congress and
hold the MBTA does not apply to timber harvesting activities.
1. If the MBTA was intended to reach land uses
which incidentally cause the Death of migratory
birds, then Congress need not have enacted
the Migratory Bird Conservation Act of 1929
which was designed to reach such land uses.
Confirmation of the limited scope of the MBTA is found
in the subsequently enacted Migratory Bird Conservation Act
of 1929 (Conservation Act). 16 U.S.C. §§ 715-715(s) (1996).
The Conservation Act was enacted to provide for federal land
acquisition "where the acquisition of lands is approved by a
commission and the State." 16 U.S.C. §§ 715-715(s) (1996).
As the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals noted: "[T]he
MBTA['s] stated purpose proscribes the hunting, capture,
possession, and sale of migratory birds... The Conservation
Act authorizes ... the [acquisition of] land for ... migratory
bird sanctuaries." United States v. North Dakota, 650 F.2d
911, 913 (8th Cir. 1981). If the MBTA already precluded tim-
ber harvesting or other land use activities which would di-
rectly or indirectly cause migratory bird deaths as CSB
argues, the subsequently enacted Conservation Act would
have been unnecessary. Stated another way, there would be
no reason for Congress to enact the Conservation Act author-
izing the purchase of bird sanctuaries if the MBTA already
proscribed the incidental deaths of migratory birds through
ordinary land uses. Under CSB's reading of the MBTA, the
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entire country is already a bird sanctuary. This court should
reject CSB's logic and adopt the plain logic of the North Da-
kota court which serves as compelling evidence indicating the
MBTA was not meant to interfere with ordinary land uses
such as timber harvesting.
2. If the MBTA was meant to restrict timber
harvesting activities, then Congress would have
repealed the previously enacted National
Forest System logging authorization.
The historical context of the MBTA's enactment further
demonstrates it does not apply to timber harvesting activi-
ties. See Sierra Club v. Martin, 110 F.3d 1551, 1555 (1997).
Twenty years before the enactment of the MBTA, Congress
passed the Organic Administration Act of 1897 which author-
ized logging in forests such as the New Union National Forest
"for the purpose of furnishing a continuous supply of timber
for the use and necessities of the citizens of the United
States." 16 U.S.C. § 475 (1996). Blackacre does not dispute
the Organic Administration Act's congressional mandate au-
thorizing such timber harvesting incidentally causes the
deaths of migratory birds. As the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals held in Martin: "It is difficult to imagine that Con-
gress enacted the MBTA barely twenty years later intending
to prohibit... [bird deaths caused by timber harvesting activ-
ities] given that the Forest Service's authorization of logging
on federal lands inevitably results in the deaths of individual
birds and the destruction of nests." Martin, 110 F.3d at 1555.
Congress's long-standing authorization of timber harvesting
activities in national forests indicates that the subsequently-
enacted MBTA does not apply to previously authorized tim-
ber harvesting activities in national forests, including the
New Union National Forest.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant Blackacre respect-
fully requests this Court to reverse the District Court's deci-
sion granting CSB judicial review under the Administrative
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Procedures Act and granting CSB standing under Article III
of the Constitution. Appellant Blackacre also requests this
Court reverse the District Court's holding that the MBTA is a
strict liability criminal offense which applies to timber har-
vesting activities.
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